

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 304457  
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY PM/ISP - JHAWES:LLB  
APPROVED BY PM-LHGELB  
EUR-JGOODBY  
O:JETHYDEN  
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-----120655 220134Z /62

O R 212355Z DEC 77 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USNMR SHAPE BRUSSELS

S E C R E T STATE 304457

NODIS  
USSALTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MNUC, NATO

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH BLECH: ENHANCED RADIATION

1. IN WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS WITH POLITICAL DIRECTOR  
BLECH ON SALT AND RELATED ISSUES, REPORTED SEPTTEL,  
PM DIRECTOR GELB RAISED QUESTION OF ENHANCED RADIATION  
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WEAPON DECISION. NOTING THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S REPLY  
TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER HAD NOT STATED A GERMAN  
POSITION ON THE US THOUGHTS, HE INDICATED THAT THE  
ALLIANCE NEEDED TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE,  
AND INVITED FRG SUGGESTIONS. GELB STRESSED THAT OUR  
INABILITY TO MAKE A DECISION PUT US IN AN IMPOSSIBLE  
POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC POSITION, WHERE IT APPEARED

THAT ALLIANCE FORCE PLANNING DECISIONS WERE HOSTAGE  
TO A SOVIET PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.

2. GELB REVIEWED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, NOTING THAT  
THE US WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH ER PRODUCTION AND  
DEPLOYMENT, IF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO  
ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT. THE US FEELS THAT THE WEAPON WOULD  
OFFER A STRONG MILITARY DETERRENT. THE PRESIDENT,  
RECOGNIZING THAT AN ER-ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE COULD HELP  
BOTH THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND FORCE BALANCE SITUATION,  
HAD SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER SUCH A LINKAGE,  
POSSIBLY INVOLVING THE SS-20 OR MBFR. THE US COULD NOT,

HOWEVER, PROCEED ON THE MATTER UNILATERALLY. WITH  
REGARD TO THE SS-20 SUGGESTION, GELB NOTED THAT IT  
COULD SHIFT THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS  
OF NEW THEATER SYSTEMS. ALSO, IF THEY REJECTED THE  
PROPOSAL IT WOULD UNDERCUT THEIR ANTI-ER PROPAGANDA,  
WHILE FOCUSING ON THE SS-20, WHICH IS A MORE THREATENING  
WEAPON. THE US DOES NOT, HOWEVER, VIEW THE  
POSSIBILITY OF AN ER-SS-20 LINKAGE AS A SOLUTION TO  
THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS RAISED BY SOVIET THEATER  
SYSTEMS, AND WE RECOGNIZE THE ASYMMETRY BETWEEN THE  
TWO.

3. AN ALTERNATIVE THE PRESIDENT HAD SUGGESTED WOULD  
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CONSIDERED. THIS WOULD BE A MORE SYMETRICAL LINK,  
SINCE ER IS A TANK-KILLING WEAPON, AND TANKS ARE  
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GENERAL LINKAGE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SATISFACTORY  
OVERALL MBFR AGREEMENT. OR, FINALLY, WE COULD MAKE  
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION IMPROVED THROUGH  
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WITHDRAW WEAPONS IF OUR ARMS CONTROL DEMANDS WERE MET.  
THIS COULD BE A WAY TO CREATE THE CREDIBLE DEPLOYMENT  
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WERE PURSUED, THE FRG WOULD PREFER AN MBFR LINK, AND  
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3. BLECH SAID THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO EXPRESS  
A VIEW ON EITHER ER OR THE QUESTION OF AN ARMS CONTROL

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4. ON NEXT STEPS, GELB SAID THAT WE WOULD PROPOSE TO CONTINUE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS UNTIL THE US AND FRG HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON ER AND THE ARMS CONTROL QUESTION. AFTER THAT, WE COULD THINK HOW TO BRING THE ISSUE TO THE ALLIANCE; FOLLOWING AGREEMENT, THE US  
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PAGE 01 STATE 304457  
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

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-----035990 300027Z /61

O 292359Z DEC 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO DEPT OF ENERGY IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 304457

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 304457 ACTION WHITE HOUSE DATED

DEC 22:

QTE:SECRET STATE 304457

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FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 304457 SENT ACTION BONN INFO USNATO  
LONDON PARIS MOSCOW GENEVA USNMR SHAPE DEC 21.  
QUOTE SECRET STATE 304457

NODIS  
USSALTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MNUC, NATO

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2. GELB REVIEWED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, NOTING THAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH ER PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT, IF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DEPLOYMENT. THE US FEELS THAT THE WEAPON WOULD OFFER A STRONG MILITARY DETERRENT. THE PRESIDENT, RECOGNIZING THAT AN ER-ARMS CONTROL LINKAGE COULD HELP BOTH THE POLITICAL CLIMATE AND FORCE BALANCE SITUATION, HAD SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER SUCH A LINKAGE, POSSIBLY INVOLVING THE SS-20 OR MBFR. THE US COULD NOT,

HOWEVER, PROCEED ON THE MATTER UNILATERALLY. WITH REGARD TO THE SS-20 SUGGESTION, GELB NOTED THAT IT COULD SHIFT THE PUBLIC SPOTLIGHT TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF NEW THEATER SYSTEMS. ALSO, IF THEY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL IT WOULD UNDERCUT THEIR ANTI-ER PROPAGANDA,

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PAGE 01 STATE 304457  
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APPROVED BY:S/S-O:JTHYDEN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 304457

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FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 304457 SENT ACTION BONN INFO USNATO  
LONDON PARIS MOSCOW GENEVA USNMR SHAPE DEC 21.  
QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 304457

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TAGS: PFOR, PARM, MNUC, NATO

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## Message Attributes

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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
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**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
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**Drafter:** JHAWES:LLB  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Message ID:** b52a49fe-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PFOR, PARM, MNUC, UK, FR, US, NATO  
**To:** LONDON PARIS MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/b52a49fe-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009